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The Gabo Reform cabinet in 1894 instituted the sanitary police system. With no cure
or vaccine for epidemics available and few Western-trained doctors, the task of
implementing disinfection and quarantine had to be taken up by the police. However,
the sanitary police active in late Joseon Korea worked under civilian supervision. After
the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, Japan changed the sanitary police system in Korea,
reinforcing the role and the responsibility of the police. Unlike the Korean government,
the colonial authority saw police enforcement as the mainstay of administrative
implementation. The police-centered sanitizing system was fully established in 1911
when the full responsibility for sanitation work was transferred to the police.
Whenever cholera raged through Korea, one of the first measures the Japanese colonial
government took was to inspect sea vessels and trains. It was the police who were sent
to examine the vessels and crews and also to see to the implementation of quarantine.
Vaccination was regarded as the most effective preventive measure and the police
controlled all aspects of vaccination campaigns. The most critical mission the police
were assigned to carry out was house inspection. 
The police-centered anti-cholera activities seemed to work. With the exception of
the years 1919, 1920 and 1926, colonial Korea did not see as many casualties from
cholera as Japan did during the same period. However, the anti-cholera activities
carried out by the police often encountered a hostile response from the people. Some
expressed doubts about the police-centered anti-epidemic activities, arguing that the
colonial government should provide sanitation education, not forced sanitation. But
the key aspects of the police-centered sanitary system did not change. The successive
budget cuts, together with the colonial government’s desire to control its subjects,
prevented the rise of an adequate sanitary infrastructure, and led to the colonizers’
continued reliance on the sanitary police system.
Keywords: Cholera, police, anti-cholera activity, Japanese Colonial Government,
sanitary police system
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Introduction
The picture below effectively captures the argument of this article. It was taken
by the Japanese colonial government in 1919. According to the explanation on
the picture, the official is about to take the excreta of a traveler who either had
symptoms of cholera or who did not have the certificate of vaccination on
hand. In 1919, the surest method of detecting cholera in Korea was to put an
excreta sample under the microscope. This unfortunate man was forced to take
off his pants in public and had to endure the embarrassment of officials taking
his excreta. The picture is still offensive even to today’s readers, and we can
only imagine how humiliating it must have been for him. Although we know
little of the context in which it was taken, it seems that the photo was taken on
purpose by the colonial government to propagate its hard work in disease
prevention. In any case, it should be emphasized that this picture was not taken
in secret. This picture can be found in the official report on anti-cholera
activities. Therefore, we can surmise that the officials who were present at this
scene must have thought that they were justified in leaving this activity on
record. During the colonial period, the power of the colonial government to
take preventive measures grew to the point where intrusive activities such as
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Figure 1. Title page photograph from Taisho– hachinen korerabyo– boeki shi (The 1919
Report on Cholera Prevention Activities) (Keijo– [Seoul]: Cho–sen so–tokufu, 1920).
01Park Yunjae_OK  2011.1.24 3:45 PM  페이지152   (주)anyprinting(pmac) 
the one described above were seen as legitimate. 
According to the explanation appended to figure 2 (see above), the residents
of Incheon – an important seaport in western Korea – are being injected with a
cholera vaccine. The doctors are busy injecting the vaccine and the children are
awaiting their turn. The policeman at the center seems to be ordering the
residents to follow his instructions. Even the doctors seem to be bowing to the
police as well. As this image demonstrates, in colonial Korea, it was the police,
not the doctors, who had the power to direct anti-epidemic campaigns. 
This article examines the mobilization of the police by the Japanese colonial
government for disease prevention programs in Korea. To date, several research
papers have already been published on this topic.1 They have been successful in
drawing a general picture of the sanitary police system in controlling
contagious diseases. In particular, they have revealed the coerciveness of the
police in tackling the spread of epidemics. While agreeing with these
contentions, I would like to add a case study on cholera which afflicted Korea
in the 1910s and 20s and reveal the mandatory features of colonial rule by
showing the police-centered anti-epidemic activities. Cholera is a useful topic
for study because it was regarded by the colonial government as one of the
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Figure 2. Title page photograph from Taisho– hachinen korerabyo– boeki shi.
1. Sin Dongwon, Hanguk geundae bogeon uiryosa [A medical history of modern Korea] (Seoul:
Hanul, 1997), 405-9; Bak Yunjae [Park Yunjae], Hanguk geundae uihak ui giwon [The origins of
Korea’s modern medical system] (Seoul: Hyean, 2005), 355-72.
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main contagious diseases, which could endanger the colonial regime; as a
result, they enforced a system of cholera prevention.2 In fact, after the first
major outbreak of 1821, cholera became one of the deadliest diseases in Korea.
Therefore, an analysis of the anti-cholera activities will contribute to our
understanding of the nature of the police-driven sanitary system that existed in
colonial Korea. This article will also highlight the historical background and
consequences of such a police-directed anti-epidemic system. Another purpose
is to reveal the features of Japanese colonial rule: by comparing Korea to
mainland Japan, it will become clear that the police in colonial Korea
intervened more aggressively in anti-epidemic activities.
The Establishment of the Sanitary Police System
It was the Gabo Reform government (1894-1896) and not the Japanese
colonial government that first attempted to establish a sanitary police system in
Korea. The Gabo Reform was an attempt to modernize all sectors of Korean
society and medicine was no exception to that overall effort. As part of the
reforms, the Sanitary Bureau (Wisaengguk 衛生局) was established and came to
replace the Jeonuigam 典醫監, the former central hospital. Whereas the Sanitary
Bureau acted as the central institution of hygiene, the newly established police
force focused on the practical aspects of sanitary works, such as the prevention
of epidemics and disinfection. In 1895, the Sanitary Bureau cooperated with
foreign medical doctors to tackle the spread of a cholera epidemic.3
Due to the lack of records, it is not easy to discern the government’s exact
reasons for adopting the sanitary police system. Knowledge about the medical
police system in late nineteenth century Europe might have been transmitted
via Japan to the so-called Enlightenment Party (Gaehwapa 開化派), which
devoted itself to establishing a modern Korea. However, a few conclusions can
be drawn from the writings of Yu Giljun (1856-1914), one of the key figures of
the Gabo Reform, who had been to Japan in 1881 and America in 1883 as one
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2. It was estimated that in 1895 tens of thousands of cholera patients had died in Korea. But such
a high mortality rate alone does not effectively provide an explanation on why Korean people
were deeply concerned about cholera. Both the infamous symptoms, such as unbearable
suffering, unstoppable vomiting and diarrhea, and the patients’ general feeling of anxiety while
they are being transferred to a dreadful isolation ward should also be taken into account. Sin,
Hanguk geundae bogeon uiryosa, 164.
3. Gwanbo [The Korean Official Gazette], 1894.07.14. O. R. Avison, “Cholera in Seoul,” The
Korean Repository (1895), 340.
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of the first students sent abroad. In his Seoyu gyeonmun, the first Korean book
to introduce Western civilization to the Korean people, he supported the role of
the police in controlling epidemics. As the Minister of Internal Affairs in the
short-lived Gabo Reform cabinet, he also believed that government should
have the power to restrict the freedom and the rights of individuals for the sake
of the nation. He saw the police as well as sanitation laws as activities essential
for building a modern nation.4 Also, with no cure or vaccine for epidemics yet
available (a cholera vaccine was first used in Japan in 1902, but it is not certain
when it was first used in Korea), the task of implementing disinfection and
quarantine, which were unfamiliar to Korea until the introduction of Western
medicine, had to be taken up by the most competent administrative body in
Korea, the police. As sanitation (wisaeng衛生) was a newly coined term in East
Asia, oriental doctors, who were then the only officially sanctioned
practitioners in the Korean medical field, were not considered to be a useful
tool for anti-cholera activities, which had been newly developed through
Western medical perspective. 
Furthermore, during the Gabo Reforms there were very few medical
personnel who received Western medical training in Korea. Western medical
education began in 1886 in Korea, but it was not until 1902 that Korea began
to produce doctors trained in Western medicine.5 Some records testify that
before opening its ports to Western countries the Korean government used
some methods to tackle cholera, for example by distributing traditional
medicine, but with the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to
ascertain whether the medicine was effective or not.6 With few trained experts,
it is not too difficult to understand that early epidemic control in Korea relied
on the police to oversee the disinfection and quarantine of a large population.
In 1895, when cholera broke out in the northern part of the peninsula, the
Gabo Reform government ordered the population, including doctors, to report
cholera patients to local police stations. The police also took a leading role in
inspecting patients and enforcing disinfection.7
However, the role of the police at the time was still confined to practical
matters. More comprehensive epidemic control was conducted by central and
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4. Yu Giljun, Seoyu gyeonmun [Observations of a Journey to the West] (Tokyo: Ko–junsha 交詢
社, 1895), 272-4.
5. Sin, Hanguk geundae bogeon uiryosa, 276-9. 
6. Sin Dongwon, “Joseonmal ui cholera yuhaeng, 1821-1910” [Cholera epidemics in Korea in
the late Joseon, 1821-1910], Hanguk gwahaksahak hoegi 11, no. 1 (1989), 66-73.
7. Gwanbo, 1895.06.08; 06.10. 
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local officials.8 This pattern is clearly shown in the writings of Oliver R.
Avison, a Presbyterian medical missionary, who, at the time, was in charge of
the newly created Sanitary Board. He describes the situation as follows. 
It was decided that we should call a meeting of all the physicians in Seoul and
organize a Sanitary Board . . . . During the next two days, the organization was
completed, both Japanese and Western physicians being included. The officers
elected were, Pres. Dr. Avison, Vice Pres. Dr. Kozio, Sect’y Miss Dr. Cutler. . . . A
central office was opened and placed in charge of both Japanese and Western
Physicians. . . . His Excellency the Home Minister [Yu Giljun], who authorized us
to carry on the work thereafter without consulting any one, and full control over
a special force of policemen detailed from the regular force to assist us.9
As Avison’s report states, the police functioned under the command of the
Sanitary Board, which consisted of doctors of different nationalities but who
shared a common worldview on medical practice. The doctors of the Sanitary
Board had the authority to direct and to dispatch the police in support of
epidemic control. Also, according to Avison, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
even granted him the right to dismiss problematic policemen.10 The police were
placed under civilian officials or, more precisely, considering the powers
granted to the doctors, they were commanded by the medical professionals.
In 1896, the legislation on epidemic control enacted under the Gwangmu
Reform put more emphasis on the role of the civilian officials in controlling
epidemics. As a result, the town headman became the reporting authority
rather than the police.11 In 1902, when cholera broke out again, the Korean
government instructed the national police agency to establish the Provisional
Board of Sanitation (Imsi wisaengwon 臨時衛生院) to take charge of the
outbreak. Heads of central and regional governments participated in the
operation of the Provisional Board of Sanitation. Moreover, the foreign medical
doctors joined as major commissioners and the students from the Uihakgyo,
the national Western medical school, carried out quarantine efforts and made
visits to localities.12 In other words, cholera control was conducted as a
cooperative effort between the police, government officials, and medical
personnel.
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8. Gwanbo, 1895.intercalary05.13. 
9. O. R. Avison, “Cholera in Seoul,” The Korean Repository (1895), 339-44.
10. Gidok sinbo [The Christian News], 1932.05.04. 
11. Gwanbo, 1899.08.29. 
12. Gwanbo, 1902.07.29; Gakbu cheonguiseo jonan [Official Ministry Documents], 23-96.
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After the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, Japan transformed various Korean
institutions to further aid their colonial rule. In the process, they changed the
role and the responsibility of the police as well. In 1906, to further increase
bureaucratic efficiency, the Japanese Residency-General transferred the duties
of the Department of Sanitation (Wisaenggwa 衛生課) to the police.13 Given
that there were no independent organizations in charge of sanitation, the
installation of the Department of Sanitation within the police agency reinforced
the role of the police in overseeing the overall hygiene projects.14 It is true that
in 1893 local police in Japan was granted full power in performing sanitary
activities. Yet, the situation in Japan was somewhat different at the central
government level. Contrary to colonial Korea, the Bureau of Sanitation existed
along with the Bureau of Police, making general plans on sanitary works.15
In colonial Korea, the police-centered sanitary system was completed in
1911 after the Department of Sanitation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was
abolished so that all sanitary activities of governmental and public hospitals
would be performed by the police. By the following year, the jurisdiction over
quarantine was also transferred to the police.16 Until 1919, there would be no
other agency in charge of sanitary activities apart from the police officers under
the command of the Ministry of Police. 
When the colonial government implemented the Cultural Policy (bunka
seiji) in the aftermath of the March First Movement, it introduced changes to
the police-directed epidemic control and sanitation legislation.17 In 1919, the
government transferred authority to control epidemics from the director of the
provincial police to provincial governors. The decentralization of policies on
sanitation followed suit the year after. In 1920, when cholera broke out, the
colonial government simply mapped out a general plan to allow each province
to address the crisis at the provincial level. The devolution of authority
proceeded to the point where, in 1924, the colonial government greatly
expanded the power of local governments to intervene in epidemic prevention.
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13. Jubon [Memorials to the King] (Seoul: Seoul daehakgyo Kyujanggak, 1996) 9, 5.
14. The sanitation work done by the Department of Sanitation within the National Police Agency
was transferred to the Daehan uiwon (Daehan Hospital) in 1907 and then moved again to the
Department of Sanitation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1907. 
15. Sugaya Akira, Nihon iryo seidosi [History of the medical institution in Japan] (Tokyo:
Harashobo, 1976), 20-2. 
16. Bak, Hanguk geundae uihak, 334-5.
17. The new policy was intended to gradually prepare Koreans for independence in ‘due course’
of time. See Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 154-7. 
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As a result, the doctors, upon examination of corpses, were required to report
to the village headmen and the town mayor as well as the police.18
On the surface, there were numerous similarities in the approaches taken by
the Late Joseon and Japanese colonial governments to the question of hygiene
and sanitation. However, there were also a number of key differences. Whereas
the Korean government had envisioned epidemic prevention with civilian
officials at the helm and the police playing a supportive role, the colonial
government saw the police as the head, with the administration as a
complementary body. Whenever cholera was detected in the 1910s, it was the
police chief, not the governor, who issued announcements ordering Korean
subjects to report suspected patients to the authorities. Also, the chief of the
national police exhorted the provincial police to stringently apply the Infectious
Disease Prevention Act, promulgated in 1915, to possible carriers as well.19
Further illustration of this pattern will be seen below with the example of the
1920 cholera outbreak. When this outbreak occurred, the colonial government
dispatched officials to the crisis area and ordered them to devise a plan to
address the problem. The dispatched officials discussed the strategies for
fighting cholera with the provincial chief of police, rather than with the
governor of the province.20
The Anti-cholera Activities of the Police 
Clearly, the cholera outbreaks did not originate in Korea. The disease usually
came through China and Japan. The annexation of Korea brought growth in
human and material exchanges with Japan and thus increased the exposure of
the Korean population to cholera as well. Furthermore, the narrow width of
the Yalu River – the physical border between Korea and China – made it easier
for the disease to travel into the peninsula.21
The police began to intervene at the very first stage of anti-cholera
measures. Whenever a cholera invasion loomed on the horizon, one of the very
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18. Cho–sen so–tokufu kanpo [The Official Gazette of the Government-General in Korea],
1919.09.11, 1924.06.02; Taisho– kyunen korera byo–hoe kisi [The 1920 Report on the Anti-
cholera Preventive Activities], 58 (Hereafter, “The 1920 Report”).
19. Cho–sen iho [The Bulletin on Korea] 10 (1916), 142. 
20. The 1920 Report, 11.
21. Taisho– jugonen korera byo–ki ni kan suru kiroku [The 1926 report on cholera prevention
activities], 3 (Hereafter, “The 1926 Report”); Taisho– hachinen korerabyo– boeki shi [The 1919
report cholera prevention activities], 9 (Hereafter, “The 1919 Report”).
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first measures the colonial government took was to inspect sea vessels and
trains. The inspection of sea vessels was crucial since the disease was almost
always brought into Korea by incoming vessels. The government then
designated seaports as cholera-infected districts and imposed quarantine on all
vessels stationed at these ports. Although doctors were dispatched to key
seaports, on occasions such as these, it was the police who were sent to
examine the vessels and crews and also to see to the implementation of the
quarantine. For example, when the port of Shimonoseki was identified as a
possible conduit for the disease, the police were sent to inspect passengers
coming to Busan from Shimonoseki.22 The deaths of passengers were to be
reported to the police and the vessels originating from Shimonoseki were
forbidden to contact other vessels.23
All crews and passengers coming from cholera-ridden districts were
quarantined upon their arrival to Korea. Passengers were not allowed to leave
their entry point unless they extended their stay in Korea beyond the permitted
duration. Also, passengers were required to have excreta inspection at the
slightest chance of an outbreak. For the colonial government, the best possible
method of protecting Korea from cholera was to investigate all vessels, to
inspect all crews and passengers for their excreta and to search all incoming
baggage.24
With a deadly disease such as cholera, train inspection was no exception to
the rule of police-led sanitary vigilance. Although it was widely acknowledged
that train inspection was not the most effective way to prevent the spread of
disease, train crews were nonetheless required to report the discovery of
suspects to the police, and the police in turn had to check the physical
condition of the passengers.25 For each passenger, the police generated profiles
detailing personal information, the point of departure and arrival, as well as
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22. Cho–sen iho 10 (1916), 141; The 1920 Report, 161-2; The 1926 Report, 109; Cho–sen iho 9
(1919), 103. 
23. Cho–sen iho 12 (1916), 109. 
24. The 1920 Report, 161-2; Ito Kenzo et al., “Taisho– gonen Cho–sen ni okeru korera ryuko ni
tsuite” [On Cholera in 1916 Korea], Cho–sen igakukai zashi 20 (1917), 26. As the surest way to
identify if a person was infected with cholera was conducting an excreta inspection, the colonial
government mobilized all institutions including private hospitals which were able to conduct
inspection. According to 1920 report, 5,771 out of 16,991 patients, namely 33.96% of patients
were confirmed as cholera-infected by excreta inspection. The 1919 Report, 96; The 1920
Report, 146. 
25. Cho–sen iho 10 (1916), 144; Cho–sen iho 9 (1919), 101; Cho–sen iho 9 (1919), 104. The
quarantine doctors were dispatched to examine the passengers at the train station. Maeil sinbo
[Daily News], 1910.10.02.
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the name of the final destination where he or she was to notify their arrival.
This was applied even to those individuals who did not show symptoms of the
disease and were unfortunate to come from the same region as the diseased
passengers.26
As for the train inspection, when a passenger was identified with cholera,
all passengers had to leave the train and undergo excreta inspection.27 In
addition, whenever a cholera epidemic seemed imminent, those coming from
problematic regions such as Andong, China, had to go through excreta
inspection at the border and they were allowed to enter the country only upon
proving their bill of health. For those individuals who attempted to evade
inspection, the colonial government punished them by making it impossible to
buy train tickets without the certificate of vaccination.28
This system of detection, reporting, and inspection was not only confined to
public routes and open spaces. The capacity of the Japanese colonial
government to enforce disease prevention reached down to the smallest of
units. When a family member showed symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea, the
head of the responsible household was required to alert the doctor. Upon
diagnosing the disease, the doctor in turn had to immediately report to the
police.29 Thus, from the inspection of ships over trains to individual
households, everything was either carried out directly by the police or doctors
or other professionals who were beholden to the police, who thus occupied the
top place in the sanitary chain of command.
Another public site where the police carried out inspections was
restaurants. At the time, it was understood that the disease was contracted
from spoiled food and the colonial police performed routine inspections of
places where food was served to make sure that vendors abided by pertinent
hygiene regulations. Water was also targeted as another potential route for the
spread of disease and the population was strongly encouraged to boil water for
consumption.30
The colonial government believed that vaccination was the most effective
preventive measure and in all its reports it was cited again and again that eight
or nine out of ten people who were vaccinated gained immunity to a particular
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26. Cho–sen iho 9 (1919), 104-5. 
27. Ito Kenzo et al., “Taisho– gonen Cho–sen ni okeru korera,” 27.
28. Cho–sen iho 11 (1919), 138, 140. 
29. Cho–sen so–tokufu kanpo [The Official Gazette of the Government-General in Korea],
1916.09.06. 
30. Cho–sen so–tokufu kanpo, 1920.08.06, 1916.10.11; Cho–sen iho 12 (1916), 109. 
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disease. They also trumpeted the fact that some areas had been saved from the
plight of the disease due to cholera vaccinations. In promoting vaccination
against cholera, the colonial government not only aimed to promote wider use
of vaccination, but also attempted to deflect attention from the fact that they
were responsible for poor public sanitary conditions and the lack of adequate
medical facilities. When asked to respond to the dismal failure of the preventive
measures, the colonial government cited the very “primitiveness” of Koreans as
the principle reason for the failure, rather than admit any responsibility on the
part of the government.31
That is why, whenever fears of cholera outbreaks were raised, the colonial
government invariably resorted to vaccination. Considering that in 1902, when
Japan for the first time made its own vaccine, some debates were already
taking place on the effectiveness of vaccination,32 it would not be unfair to say
that the colonial officials had exaggerated the efficacy of vaccination, in an
attempt to suppress mounting skepticism. For the government, the detection of
a single patient, even if he or she was only suspected of having the disease, was
usually sufficient to swiftly mobilize the vaccination programs. In 1920, the
colonial government thus legalized its implicit belief in the effects of
vaccination by promulgating an act which mandated that Koreans carry
certificates of vaccination at all times. As people sometimes fabricated
certificates or bought other’s certificates, the officer checked the details of the
certificate, for instance, name, age, vaccination date and place, in order to
confirm whether the certificate was genuine or not.33
As mentioned above, the police controlled all aspects of vaccination
campaigns. In some remote areas where there were no doctors, the police
themselves administered vaccinations to villagers. In fact, for a government
experiencing chronic shortage of doctors, utilizing the police relieved the
already overburdened medical personnel. The role of the police sometimes
reached the point where the police station acted as a dispensary in the most
isolated areas. The lack of medical doctors also legitimized the police to
provide medical treatment under “unavoidable circumstances.” As a result,
from the viewpoint of the colonial government, they were qualified to give
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31. Maeil sinbo, 1919.08.13; Donga ilbo [The Donga Daily News], 1937.08.31; The 1919
Report, 167; The 1926 Report, 24.
32. Yamamoto Shunichi, Nihon Korerashi [A History of Cholera in Japan] (Tokyo: Tokyo
University Press, 1982), 844-50. According to a medical text book, vaccines of cholera have no
useful role in an outbreak. Stephen Lock et al., eds., The Oxford Illustrated Companion to
Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 184.
33. The 1926 Report, 24, 131; The 1920 Report, 140-1.
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treatment to patients under extenuating circumstances.34
The police had the exclusive task of handling patients during anti-epidemic
campaigns. When cholera spread, the police were required to block roads, to
confine patients to their houses and at times even to isolate an entire town.35
Furthermore, they were the sole authority permitted to transport patients to
quarantine hospitals.36
While the activities described above are already very significant, the most
critical mission of the police was to carry out house inspections. The Korean
population generally hid patients from the eyes of the inspector. Although the
government usually encouraged voluntary reporting, its measures were
ineffective, and families would often hide sick members in the nearby
mountains.37 At a time when no effective cure to cholera existed, patients were
carried away from the rest of the family to an isolation facility or to a hospital,
which to the patients represented “a living hell.”38 By law, traditional burials
were not permitted for cholera victims and, as a result, Koreans sometimes left
dead bodies in nearby mountains to avoid cremation. In a society where
Confucian customs had been deeply engrained, cremation was considered to be
an insult to the dead. Thus, the police were required to make rounds to ferret
out hidden bodies.39
When an epidemic like cholera struck, the colonial government immediately
dispatched the police to the outbreak area and made them pay visits to each
household. In 1920, 66% of the total number of patients were discovered
through “visits” paid by the police during epidemic control campaigns,40 which
means Korean people did not voluntarily report. The inspection of households
was not only confined to periods of epidemic outbreaks, but was also carried
out at other times as well. With the 1909 cholera outbreak still fresh in their
mind, in 1910, the colonial government ordered the police to perform house
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34. The 1920 Report, 138, 153; Cho–sen keisatsu to bunka [The Korean Police and Culture],
(1930), 305.
35. Cho–sen iho 12 (1916), 110. In cases where there was not enough police to guard isolated
towns, organizations such as the local YMCA and the Jawidae (the self-defense association) were
recruited to aid the police in their activities. The 1926 Report, 107. 
36. The 1920 Report, 101. 
37. Ito Kenzo et al., “Taisho– gonen Cho–sen ni okeru korera,” 27. 
38. For more details on the practice of forcibly taken patients to isolation hospitals, see Park
Yunjae [Bak Yunjae], “Anti-Cholera Measures by the Japanese Colonial Government and the
Reaction of Koreans in the Early 1920s,” The Review of Korean Studies 8, no. 4 (2005): 175-7. 
39. The 1920 Report, 89, 105. 
40. Ibid., 91.
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searches and to conduct investigations into the handling of food and public
cleanliness. Although there was no sign of cholera, the colonial government still
carried out these sanitizing activities.41 According to one source, the colonial
government considered the “house inspections performed by the authorities (to
have) worked most effectively.”42
The Consequences of the Police-Centered Anti-Epidemic Activities 
The colonial government gave two reasons for assigning such a central role to
the police in conducting anti-epidemic campaigns: first, the apparent lack of
hygiene awareness among Koreans, and second, the shortage of medical
facilities.43 Colonial authorities argued that Koreans had no consciousness of
modern hygiene. They pointed out that Koreans did not make any efforts to
remove excreta left in the public realm and were not alarmed at all over the
sight of flies swarming around food. To the government, the traditional Korean
burial custom was also responsible for the rapid spread of cholera since the
practice of having meals with the dead at funeral ceremonies made it easy for
one to contract the disease. Furthermore, they feared that the Korean habit of
hiding epidemic patients risked rapid multiplication of new patients.44
An article published in a police journal in 1930 used these examples of
unsanitary Koreans to lend support to the expansion of police duties to include
the use of force towards the populace.45 The criticisms of “unclean” Koreans
served two purposes for the colonial government: first, shirking the
responsibility for the spread of disease, and second, the justification for
intervening into Koreans’ traditional way of life. 
In the 1920s, there were only 1,719 doctors who received Western medical
education in Korea. In terms of the population ratio, this meant that there was
only one doctor available per 13,000 people in 1919. This number was small
even when compared to Taiwan. Under such circumstances, the number of
medical personnel participating in epidemic control could only be limited. In
1926, doctors could only fill 6 out of 12 quarantine offices and also occupy
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41. Cho–sen so–tokufu shisei nenpo [The Annual Report of Government-General in Korea] (1910),
324.
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43. The 1919 Report, 141. 
44. The 1919 Report, 27, 141.
45. Cho–sen keisatsu to bunka, 55.
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only 10 of the 13 provincial sanitary bureaus.46
With such a shortage of Western medical doctors, the other medical
personnel whom the colonial government could have relied upon were oriental
doctors. In fact, if there was an outbreak of cholera, the colonial government
could have utilized traditional oriental doctors, by imparting knowledge on
contagious diseases.47 However, from the viewpoint of a “civilized” Japan,
oriental doctors were not trustworthy practitioners of medicine. The colonial
government did not believe in the diagnosis offered by these doctors nor in the
efficacy of their treatments. They thought that oriental doctors would
misdiagnose a patient suffering from vomiting and diarrhea as neurasthenic
and would even go so far as to issue death certificates without ever examining
patients. Worse yet, they felt an oriental doctor would falsely register diseases
and symptoms.48 According to one colonial source, Korean oriental doctors
were “less qualified and had little knowledge of epidemics.”49
The colonial police could not but aggressively intervene in anti-epidemic
activities. This was confirmed in the cholera control activities of 1926. 2,500
people, including provincial officials, quarantine commissioners and local
county and town officials participated in the control activities. However, out of
the 2,500 participants, the police accounted for 2,256, which translates to
about 90 percent of the total number of participants.50 Clearly, the police was
at the center of epidemic control. 
The police-centered anti-epidemic activities would appear to have worked.
With the exception of the years 1919, 1920 and 1926, colonial Korea did not
see as many casualties from cholera as Japan did during the same period.51
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46. The 1919 Report, 141; The 1926 Report, 33; The shortage of doctors was also felt at port
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analysis, but since Taiwan has a different biological environment from Korea, cholera has never
been a main problem there.
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When considering the fact that England was protected from cholera by
strict quarantine controls imposed on its ports,53 we can infer the same for
Korea. The rigorous imposition of quarantine measures and the anti-cholera
campaigns carried out by the colonial police may well have served to safeguard
Korea. Ironically, the heavy casualties from cholera outbreaks in 1919-1920
and 1926 could be attributed to the March First and June Tenth Movements,
the biggest nationalist movements in colonial Korea. That is to say, the police
was too occupied with the suppression of Korean nationalist movements to pay
attention to the cholera outbreak. In other words, it was almost impossible for
them to perform full scale anti-cholera activities.54
Although there was no big nationalist movement in 1920, the fact that this
year saw higher cholera casualties than other years might be explained by the
reorganization of the police system around this time. In the wake of the March
First Movement, the Japanese metropole government, in order to stabilize its
colonial regime in Korea, decided to increase the number of policemen from
late 1919 to early 1920. Two thousand new policemen were recruited to bring
the total to fifteen thousand,55 but the new recruits were unaccustomed to
police activities such as anti-epidemic activities. In 1911, when pneumonic
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Table 1. Cholera patients and casualties in Japan and Korea, 1910-192952
1910 1912 1913 1914 1916 1917 1919 1920 1922 1925 1926 1929
Japan patients 2845 2614 87 5 10371 894 407 4969 743 624 25 205
deaths 1656 1763 106 100 7482 718 356 3417 542 363 13 114
Korea patients 486 122 1 - 2066 - 16915 24229 49 6 252 18
deaths 382 78 1 - 1253 1 11533 13568 23 5 159 15
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plague broke out, the police attributed the success of controlling the disease to
quarantine rather than to drugs such as carbolic acid.56 Therefore, one can see
why the colonial government sought to legitimize the sanitary police system in
Korea. 
The anti-cholera activities carried out by the police often encountered a
hostile response from the people. Rumors of isolation hospitals killing people
and of vaccinations poisoning innocent people circulated among the populace.
In particular, the isolation hospital was regarded as a living hell.57 With the
population visibly opposed to anti-cholera activities, isolation of the carriers of
disease became virtually an impossible task. The intense involvement of the
police further exacerbated the already tense situation. In particular, the
intrusion by the police into the women’s quarters of the households for excreta
collection produced the most vocal resistance. As a result, one governor ended
up regretting the excessive involvement of the police in the sanitation
program.58
As seen in the case of the administration of vaccines, the police in Korea
were stretched beyond their capacities and for some medical authorities, this
was a worrisome development. From their viewpoint, the police were no
different from civilians in their lack of medical knowledge. Also, no matter
how provisionary their involvement may have been, for the doctors, the
administration of medicine by the police carried the risk of treating patients
more as security subjects than as medical patients.59
Some publicly expressed doubts about the police-centered anti-epidemic
activities. In 1926, at the height of the cholera control system, Gim Changse
[Kim Changsei] 金昌世, who was in charge of the Department of Public Health
at the Severance Medical College, strongly criticized the sanitation policies of
the colonial government. He argued that forced sanitation by the police
constituted the mainstay of the government’s sanitation policies. He believed
that such approach only resulted in more resistance from people. He ended the
article by exhorting the government “to provide sanitation education, not
forced sanitation.”60 To Kim, the notion of sanitation policy and anti-epidemic
activities included education of the people as well as the implementation of
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government regulation and supervision.61
Also in his view, education in public sanitation could further improve the
current sanitary policy system. In fact, Koreans’ sense of sanitation had been
improving. In 1926, when cholera broke out, according to one newspaper
article, people “rushed to get shots.” Another article writes that in cities like
Sinuiju and Pyongyang, “the police were overwhelmed” by the number of
people demanding to receive vaccine shots. The residents of Pyongyang even
complained that their city administration did not take proper actions on
excreta management. According to the article, the residents “were very enraged
at the negligence of the city administration.”62
Despite this criticism, the colonial government continued to simply rely on
the police to perform sanitation duties, especially since doctors were still very
hard to come by. The colonial government did have three categories of doctors
to call upon in case of emergency – those from public, provincial, and private
hospitals – but these doctors all had reasons to avoid the state. The few
number of doctors at public and provincial hospitals were so overwhelmed
with work that they could not attend to the anti-epidemic activities. As for the
private doctors, medical associations at the time simply did not have the means
to organize and mobilize them for the state. With such an acute shortage of
medical professionals, in cases such as the 1926 cholera outbreak, the colonial
government desperately relied on personnel from the Department of Bacterial
Inspection to work in the field.63
Due to budget cuts, the government thus continued to rely on the sanitary
police system. With little resources available, the government could not
establish sufficient medical facilities to address the needs of the population. In
summarizing the epidemic control activities in 1920, the Government-General
concluded as follows:
Due to the deteriorated finances of local governments, there is only one myeon
(district) equipped with an isolation hospital or ward in each gun (county). The
budget assigned for epidemic control is so small that provinces such as North
Chungcheong and Gangwon cannot receive funds for epidemic control. As a
consequence, much needed measures for epidemic control cannot be properly
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61. Gim Changse agreed that in some parts the compulsory interventions by the police were
essential to the prevention of contagious diseases. Yet, regardless of the validity of these
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taken.64
To wit, the metropole government in Japan also took austerity measures at this
time. Although Japanese finances briefly improved after the First World War,
the government soon had to resort to budget cuts. In 1924, after the Kando
earthquake, the Kato– Tosaburo– cabinet had to run on very tight finances.65 As a
result, in the same year in Korea, three out of thirteen doctors in charge of
provincial sanitation were dismissed due to lack of funds. Such layoffs further
exacerbated the already worsening situation, as the dismissed doctors were
those who were most knowledgeable in epidemic control activities. The 1926
report expressed this problem when it wrote that “the biggest obstacle in
epidemic control is the lack of experienced technicians for sanitation
administration.”66
The colonial government understood that it needed financial and human
resources to adequately address epidemic problems. With such a poor
economic situation, however, the establishment of proper sanitary facilities was
almost impossible.67 After the Great Depression of 1929, the government’s
financial woes increased and the escalation of wars from the early 1930s
onward made it difficult for both the colonial and the metropole governments
to secure a sufficient budget to expand medical facilities and supply necessary
equipment. 
With an almost 50% success rate in detecting cholera patients,68 to the
colonial government the police was naturally the most dependable of all
institutions. As people showed reluctance to sanitary activities, one policeman
was quoted as saying “without the compulsory actions of the police, sanitary
activities would not have been easy.”69 Hence reliance on the police was an
inevitable choice for the colonial government. 
Cholera was not the only contagious disease that the police was helping to
combat. Typhoid fever was another disease that legitimized police-driven anti-
epidemic activities in colonial Korea. Numerous reports were made on typhoid
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in colonial Korea, because an unaccountable fever was often mistaken for the
said disease. It is also the reason why it was referred to as “the king of
epidemics in Korea.”70 Since typhoid mainly spread through water, modern
sanitary infrastructures, such as water and sewage systems, needed to be put in
place.71 For the colonial government, however, the more critical challenge lay
in discovering patients.72 Thus, the police was tasked with searching for
patients, as it had done in the case of cholera outbreaks. 
As colonial rule progressed, the function of the police gradually moved
from monitoring acute infectious diseases to chronic diseases. In the 1930s, the
colonial government focused its medical interest on Hansen’s disease and
tuberculosis. The reason for choosing tuberculosis had to do with the fact that
it was considered one of the most debilitating diseases affecting the health of
Korean male adults. By this time, military conscription had begun to intensify
and securing healthy male adults for war mobilization was of utmost
importance to the government. The police however, were not as successful in
tackling tuberculosis as they had been for cholera. Since tuberculosis had a long
incubation period, there was no need for immediate intervention by the police.
Also, unlike the quarantine wards, tuberculosis sanatoria were seen as places of
recuperation rather than confinement. To address the problem, in 1936, the
Korean Tuberculosis Prevention Association was founded to build more
sanatoria throughout the country.73
In response to the increasing demand, the colonial government placed
spittoons in public places. According to the administration, phlegm was found
to be the major carrier of the tuberculosis bacterium and, therefore, proper
disposal of phlegm was more than adequate to address the need. This stop-gap
measure was of course, accompanied by continued emphasis on the need for
public awareness of hygiene and the police monitoring of public spitting.74 As
for cholera, the government passed regulations on tuberculosis but most of
them were short-lived. They did not pass any long-term proposals such as the
building of a national sanatorium system. This can again be explained through
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the continued budget problems.75 However, as seen above, the colonial
government continued to rely heavily on the police to maintain the Korean
sanitation system. What had been envisioned during the Gabo reforms as a
supplementary body within the overall structure, developed into a system that,
by the late 1930s, ended up hindering the growth of sanitation infrastructure. 
Conclusion
In 1894, the Gabo Reform cabinet first instituted the sanitary police system in
Korea. When compared to European nations, which by this time had moved
towards practicing social medicine, Korea lagged behind the global trend.
However, for the Enlightenment Party nation building was primordial. Yu
Giljun, one of its members, went so far as to argue that the nation was justified
in intervening in private affairs in times of crisis, such as during an epidemic. At
the same time, however, the Gabo cabinet also instituted a Sanitary Board, led
by doctors, to coordinate and direct sanitation activities, including those by the
police. Despite the lofty goals spelled out by the party, however, the short-lived
Gabo government did not have the means to establish a modern sanitary
system. 
Under the colonial government, a different sanitation system was established.
As illustrated in the case of cholera outbreaks, the role of civilians was greatly
reduced and that of the police was greatly expanded. Since colonial rule during
the 1910s mainly focused on the suppression of Korean resistance, the colonial
government would not permit civilian participation in anti-epidemic activities.
The police had to be tapped as a more trustworthy agent to realize the goals of
the state. Also, given the fact that the mortality rate from cholera was low
during this period, the colonial police could effectively present itself as
protector of native Koreans.
As the colonial rule moved into the 1930s, the shift in the government’s
interest to Hansen’s disease and tuberculosis demanded a reconfiguration of the
functions of the police. They had, until then, been more familiar with
addressing epidemic crises than managing more routine outbreaks of infectious
diseases. However, despite the rising need, the key aspects of the police-
centered sanitary system did not change and no major overhaul of the
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sanitation system was attempted. The successive budget cuts certainly were one
factor in this, but it could also be argued that the colonial government clung to
the sanitary police system lest the colonized acquire their own well-equipped
sanitation infrastructure.
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